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CLEARING THE AIR ON RADON TESTING:
THE DUTY OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS TO
PROTECT PROSPECTIVE HOMEBUYERS
I.

Introduction

Radon, a radioactive gas,' has been discovered in homes 2 in at
least thirty-eight states. 3 The presence of the gas in homes poses
serious health risks. Exposure to radon gas greatly increases the

1. A colorless, odorless and tasteless gas, radioactive radon comes from the
natural breakdown of uranium in the soil. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY & U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PUB. No. OPA-86-004, A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE To RADON: WHAT IT Is AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 1 (1986) [hereinafter
A CITIzEN's GUIDE To RADON]. Mixed with outdoor air, radon does not pose a
significant health risk. See id. Because of the limited exchange between indoor and
outdoor air in energy efficient homes, radon is especially hazardous in such homes.
See id. Levels of radon vary with the building's construction, the concentration
of-radon in the underlying soil and the rate at which indoor air is exchanged with
outdoor air. See id. See generally U.S. GENEkAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.
RCED-86-170, AIR POLLUTION: HAZARDS OF INDOOR RADON COULD POSE A NATIONAL
HEALTH PROBLEM (1986) [hereinafter AIR POLLUTION]; see also NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, RADON 2 (1986) [hereinafter RADON].
2. Radon moves through soil and rock and seeps into homes through cracks
and openings in the floors and foundation walls, sewer pipes, wall-floor joints,
and cracks in hollow-block walls, drains and sumps. See RADON, supra note 1, at
1; A CITIZEN'S GUIDE To RADON, supra note 1, at 1. Radon can also be released
from water or materials used in the construction of a home. See A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE TO RADON, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Radon has been reported in the following states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See Galen,
Lawyers Grapple With Radon Issue: Litigation Surge Likely, Nat'l L.J., July 21,
1986, at 10, col. 4 [hereinafter Lawyers Grapple With Radon Issue]; see also 10
State Survey Finds Peril From Radon in 1 in 5 Homes, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987,
at A14, col. 1 (fact sheet issued by EPA stating that "virtually every house in the
United States has some level of radon gas in its air"); Radon May Endanger 8
Million Homes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1985, at 8E, col. 3 (physical chemist stating
that he found high radon contamination in all fifty states).
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risk of lung cancer" to home occupants. 5 In fact, radon is the leading
cause of lung cancer after cigarette smoking. 6 Moreover, once a
homebuyer suspects that radon is present, testing 7 takes time' and
costs money. 9 To reduce radon 0 to safe levels,"' homeowners often
must pay several thousand dollars. 12
4. When radon breaks down, it emits radioactive alpha particles that cling to
dust or smoke and can be inhaled. See A CITIZEN'S GUIDE To RADON, supra note
1, at 2; Lawyers Grapple With Radon Issue, supra note 3, at 8, col. 3. Trapped
inside the lungs, the particles continue to emit energy which can damage lung tissue
cells and lead to cancer. See Am POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 18-24. The latency
period is estimated to be 20-30 years. See id.
5. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notes that lifestyle can affect
the risks of lung cancer from radon. See AIR POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 19.
Exposure to tobacco smoke in homes with radon may further increase risks of
lung cancer. See id. Children may be more sensitive to radon exposure and -thus
may face greater risks, especially since they often spend more time indoors. See
id. Since levels tend to be greater in lower floors of homes, a person who sleeps
in a basement bedroom probably faces greater risk than a person who sleeps on
a higher floor. See id.; see also RADON, supra note 1, at 1; A CITIZEN's GUIDE
TO RADON, supra note 1, at 12.
6. Radon is the leading cause of lung cancer among nonsmokers-in other
words, the second leading cause of lung cancer after cigarette smoking. See Lawyers
Grapple With Radon Issue, supra note 3, at 8, col. 2. It is a greater cause of
cancer than asbestos exposure, outdoor air pollution or other man-made sources.
See id. According to the EPA, scientists estimate that out of 130,000 lung-cancer
deaths in 1986, 5,000-20,000 may be attributed to radon. See A CITIZEN's GUIDE
To RADON, supra note 1, at 1.
7. Detection of radon requires special equipment. See A CITIZEN'S GUIDE To
RADON, supra note 1, at 5. Two devices that lay people can use to detect the
presence of radon are charcoal canisters and alpha track detectors. See id. Alternatively; private firms will perform radon tests. See id. As of October 15, 1986,
the EPA released policies to approve such firms in order to promote accurate
testing and to reduce fraud. U.S. Providing Tests On Checking for Radon, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 16, 1986, at C13, col. 1. On February 3, 1986, the EPA issued a
report stating that 143 firms, 80 of which operate nationally, are qualified to
measure indoor radon levels accurately. 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1725 (Feb. 6, 1987).
According to J. Craig Potter, EPA Assistant Administrator for air and radiation,
the listing will help prevent fly-by-night firms from deceiving the public through
phony measurements. See id. See generally Am POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 2634.
8. To ensure an accurate reading during the screening period, the EPA recommends that residents keep charcoal canisters in the home for three to seven days
and alpha detectors for two to four weeks. See A CITIZEN's GUIDE To RADON,
supra note 1, at 5. Since the levels vary from season to season and from room
to room, a screening method merely reveals the potential for a radon problem.
See id. at 6-7. The EPA has established follow-up measurement periods ranging
from one week to one year depending on the screening measurement. See id. The
New York Department of Health, however, recommends that the alpha track detector
remain in the home for a full year to obtain average annual concentrations. RADON,
supra note 1, at 4.
9. Charcoal canisters cost approximately $10 to $25 each, and alpha track
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Because radon in homes is a recently discovered phenomenon, 1"
uncertainty persists over which homes contain it.l4 Thus, a homebuyer

detectors cost approximately $20 and $50 each. See A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO RADON,
supra note 1, at 5. Certain states have provided money for testing targeted areas.
See Pennsylvania Aids Residents in Radon Fight, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at
61, col. 1. For example, Pennsylvania offered free devices to residents in communities that lie along Reading Prong, an area notoriously rich in uranium deposits.
See id. By spring of 1987, the New York State Department of Health plans to
start a $3 million testing program, free of cost to people who have taken energy
conservation measures and at a cost of $20 to others. See Radon: For the Homeowner, Some Questions and Answers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1987, at 39, col. 1.
10. According to the EPA, there are nine different methods to reduce radon
with varying degrees of effectiveness: natural ventilation; forced ventilation; heatrecovery ventilation; air supply; covering exposed earth; sealing cracks and openings;
drain-tile suction; block-wall ventilation; and sub-slab ventilation. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. OPA-86-005, RADON, REDUCTION
METHODS: A HOMEOWNER'S GUIDE 4-23 (1986) [hereinafter RADON REDUCTION
METHODS]. According to the EPA, the most effective methods for removing radon
are drain-tile suction, block-wall ventilation and sub-slab suction. See id. See
generally AIR POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 26-34.
11. Scientists measure radon levels two ways: "picocuries per liter" (pCi/) and
"working levels" (WL). See A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO RADON, supra note 1, at 5-11.
The EPA currently believes that the maximum radon level for safety is 0.02 WL
or 4 pCi/l. See id. Comparable risks at these levels are.200 chest x-rays per year.
See id. Below these levels, exposures are average or slightly above average. See id.
At levels above 1.0 WL or 200 pCi/l, however, the EPA recommends temporary
relocation if occupants cannot start to remedy the problem within a few weeks.
Id. at 11. At these levels, radon occurs at 1000 times the average outdoor level
and presents a cancer risk equivalent to that of a four pack-a-day smoker, or sixty
times the non-smoker risk, and greater than the risk of 20,000 chest x-rays per
year. Id. at 10. Factors affecting safe levels include: whether the house is weatherproofed; whether the house is ventilated; whether occupants smoke; the age of the
occupant; the amount of time spent at home; and whether anybody sleeps in the
basement, which is the usual entry point for radon. See id. at 12.
12. The cost of the most effective methods of reducing radon ranges from
$1,000 to $5,000. RADON REDUCTION METHODS, supra note 10, at 4-22. The cost
of other recommended methods ranges from $100 to $1,500, depending on the
severity and the cause of the problem. See id. In a pilot study of three different
reduction techniques in eighteen contaminated homes, cleanup costs ranged from
$4,300 to $15,700 per home. See AIR POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 26-34.
Usually, the homeowner bears the cost to remove radon, since no federal funds
are available to subsidize such work. See U.S. Says Radon Gas Is States' Fight,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1986, at 29, col. 1. Some state aid, however, is available.
See id. Pennsylvania and New Jersey each spent $4 million to combat radon in
1986. See id. Pennsylvania has a low-interest loan program to help homeowners
pay for radon reduction. See id.
On July 8, 1987, the Senate approved a bill providing $30 million over three
years to help states detect and control radon contamination in homes and schools.
See Plan on Radon Voted by Senate To Help States, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1987,
at B2, col. 6. The bill also calls for a $1.5 million program to examine the extent
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often buys a home containing radon without knowing about its presence." Although both case law 6 and legislation 17 directly address
the issue of liability for man-made radon, courts have yet to address
the issue of whether a real estate broker 8 can be liable 19 for failure

of radon contamination and methods for its control in school buildings. See id.
The legislation is pending without serious opposition in the House. See id.
13. Although radon has always existed, it has only recently been discovered in
homes. See A CITIZEN's GUIDE To RADON, supra note 1, at 3; see also AIR
POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 2; Issue of Radon: New Focus on Ecology, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 10, 1986, at A24, col. 1; Radon: The Risks and the Remedies, N.Y.
Times, May 17, 1986, at 30, col. 4. Naturally-occurring radon in homes first became
known when an engineer whose home contained extremely high radon levels set
off a nuclear power plant's radioactivity alarm as he was entering work. See Issue
of Radon: New Focus on Ecology, supra, at A24, col. 1.
14. Currently, the EPA is conducting a survey of national radon levels to
estimate exposure levels and frequency, but results of this survey will not be available
for three years. See Am POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 2.
15. See infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
16. Although no cases specifically address the liability of a real estate broker
for his failure to disclose the presence of radon, rad6n related cases do exist. See,
e.g., Wayne v. TVA, 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159
(1985) (homeowner brought product liability and negligence action against producer
of phosphate slag incorporated into concrete block used to construct plaintiff's
home, manufacturer of blocks and seller of blocks); Robles v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973) (homeowner sues EPA for results
of radioactivity survey and names and addresses of people owning homes which
exceed safety guidelines); Brafford v. Susquehanna, 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo.
1984) (homeowner sued for future damages due to enhanced cancer risk resulting
from defendant mill placing radioactive mill tailings around foundation of home
prior to homeowner's purchase of home); Nobel v. Marvin E. Kanze, Inc., Civ.
No. 02428, at 1 (Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Pa. 1983) (homebuyer sues contractor after he finds natural radon entering through cracked ventilation system).
17. Although the EPA does not regulate indoor air pollution, it has jurisdiction
to regulate radon under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7911-7925 (1983). EPA currently sets standards on man-made
radon "for the protection of the public health, safety, and the environment from
radiological and nonradiological hazards associated with residual radioactive materials ... located at inactive uranium mill tailings sites." Id. § 2022(a) (Supp.
1987). Implementation and enforcement of the standards is the responsibility of
the Atomic Energy Commission on the federal level and local governments at the
state level. Id. § 2022(d). Currently, however, no statute addresses naturally-occurring
radon.
18. For the purposes of this Note, all references to brokers are to the seller's
broker, unless otherwise noted.
19. An injured homebuyer may sue for a broad spectrum of damages. See,
e.g., Nobel v. Marvin E. Kanze, Inc., Civ. No. 02428, at 5-8 (Montgomery County
Court of Common Pleas, Pa. 1983). In Nobel, the owner of a newly-constructed
home sued the contractor for installing a cracked ventilation system through which
natural radon entered in dangerous amounts. See id. The complaint asked for
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to discover radon and warn a prospective purchaser of its presence. 21
Compounding this problem of inadequate protection for the homebuyer against brokers 2' is a lack of unified governmental strategy
in dealing with radon issues. 22 While the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has jurisdiction to research radon and provide technical assistance to the states, 23 it is reluctant to create and enforce
regulations for liability purposes. 24 Furthermore, coordination of
25
radon-related efforts among the EPA and other federal agencies

damages for expenditure of money and time in detecting the source of the emission,
the expense of surviving the winter temperatures in the house while ventilating,
the expense of decreasing and maintaining radon levels, the expense to repair,
replaster, repaint and restore the condition of home following destruction testing,
and the exposure to radon concentrations in excess of all federally-mandated radon
exposure limits. See id. As a result of exposure to radon for over two years, the
plaintiffs alleged that they had a greater risk of developing lung cancer than if
they were not exposed to high radon concentrations. See id. As a result of exposure
to radon for over two years, the plaintiffs alleged that they suffered severe emotional
distress and that their lives were permanently affected by prospective medical
expenses, loss of earnings and earning capacity. See id.
20. See infra notes 159-223 and accompanying text.
21. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
22. See generally Am POLLUTION, supra note 1; Kirsch, Behind Closed Doors:
Indoor Air Pollution and Government Policy, 6 H~Av.

ENVTL.

L. REv. 339, 360-

382 (1982) [hereinafter Indoor Air Pollution] (discussing various kinds of indoor
air pollution and possible federal statutes through which EPA could regulate them).
23. The EPA has authority under § 103 of the Clean Air Act to implement a
strategy of research, technical assistance and guidance to the states. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (1983 & Supp. 1987). -As a result of its efforts, the EPA has
accomplished the following with respect to radon: publication of two booklets, A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE To RADON, supra note 1, and RADON REDUCTION METHODS, supra
note 1; establishment of a training program for state personnel in detecting,
measuring and reducing indoor radon, see Am POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 3637; an eighteen-home project in the Reading Prong area of Pennsylvania to assess
effectiveness of various soil ventilation techniques, see id.; outlining of procedures
to be followed for testing radon, see id.; assessment of labor capabilities in
conducting radon testing efforts and publishing the result, see id.; and a projected
survey to determine radon levels in homes nationwide to be completed in October,
1989. See id.

24. The EPA claims that it does not have authority to enforce the guidelines
it publishes, since radon is not a man-made pollutant. See Issue of Radon: New
Focus on Ecology, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1986, at A24, col. 1; E.P.A. Proposes
5-Year Program Aimed at Radioactive Radon Gas, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at

B21, col. 1. In addition, there is no clear statutory authority under the Clean Air
Act nor other federal laws directing any agency to regulate indoor air pollutants.
See AIR POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 45. See generally. Indoor Air Pollution, supra
note 22, at 363-66.
25. For example, another federal agency addressing radon is the United States
Department of Energy, which tailors radon research to its home energy conservation
and radiation measurement and health effects programs. See AIR POLLUTION, supra
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is inconsistent,2 6 and local efforts to address the problem vary from
state to state. 7 While the states are generally in favor of the EPA's
current research and technical assistance, 2s some states have expressed
29
the need for further guidance.
This Note recommends that the federal government create legislation that will impose a duty on real estate brokers to test homes
30
for radon and to disclose the results to prospective purchasers.

note 1, at 38-39.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has an interest in
ensuring that HUD assisted housing exists in radon-free locations. See id. Other
federal agencies involved in radon include the Bonneville Power Administration,
the Tennessee Valley Authority and the National Cancer Institute. See id.
26. Differences in agency practices exist. See id. at 41-42. For example, there
is no consensus among federal agencies regarding the level of danger at which
action should be taken to reduce indoor radon levels. See id. at 42. Several groups,
however, address certain aspects of the problem. See id. at 41. In 1984, the
Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Coordination (CIRRPC)
was formed. See id. In 1985, the CIRRPC established a subpanel to analyze
environmental radon exposure, its health risks, the extent of exposures nationwide
and the state of knowledge about radon reduction methods. See id.
The Interagency Committee on Indoor Air Quality (CIAQ) was formed in 1983
to develop a comprehensive research strategy on indoor air quality. See id. In 1985,
the CIAQ created a radon working group that issued a report calling for: (1)
national assessment of radon exposure in buildings; (2) development and demonstration of radon reduction techniques; (3) improved ways of radon measurement;
and (4) more information on radon's health effects and estimates of risks. See id.
at 41-42. The report designated as a priority the determination of appropriate roles
for federal, state and local governments in addressing indoor radon. See id.
27. See generally id. at 40-41. State efforts to address radon problems currently
include informing homeowners of the nature and existence of radon, implementing
testing programs and helping homeowners to finance installation of radon-reduction
mechanisms. See id. For example, by the end of the winter of 1987, the New York
State Department of Health plans to start a $3 million testing program. See Radon:
For the Homeowner, Some Questions and Answers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1987, at
39, col. 1. Florida has enacted legislation giving its state agency authority to
establish and enforce environmental standards for radon, and has formally adopted
the .02 WL EPA safe level as a state standard and has prescribed construction
techniques in potentially high-radon areas. See AIR POLLUTION, supra note 1, at
40. Pennsylvania has established a $2.5 million low-interest loan program to help
homeowners finance the installation of radon reduction devices. See id.
28. See Ai POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 40.
29. States have expressed the need for the following programs: (1) radon conferences and symposia for state officials; (2) funding and research of radon mitigation
techniques; (3) national measurement standards and remedial action guidelines; (4)
a nationwide radon data clearinghouse; (5) certification of radon detectors and
mitigation contractors; and (6) financial support for testing homes for radon
contamination. See id.
30. The Supreme Court has upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, a statute designed to "establish a nationwide program to protect
society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining
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Based on a common law negligence theory," such a duty would
become part of the current obligation of a real estate broker: (1)

to conduct a reasonably diligent and competent search of property
for sale;32 and (2) to disclose to prospective homebuyers all material
defects affecting the value or desirability of the home.33 In his
investigation, the broker must use the expertise and knowledge that
34
derive from his training and experience as a professional.
Initially, the Note addresses the dilemma of the homebuyer who

discovers radon only after occupying the home and who has no

formally defined cause of action based on common law precedent
or statute.35 Part II traces the development of a real estate broker's

liability in negligence3 6 to the recently imposed duty to discover and
disclose latent defects.37 Part III analyzes the duty to discover and
disclose latent defects with respect to radon and concludes that real
estate brokers should have an affirmative duty to test for radon
and to disclose the results to prospective purchasers.38 Finally, part IV
recommends legislation to protect the unwary homebuyer who oth-

erwise would take possession of the home and suffer potential
economic loss and exposure to a carcinogenic substance.3 9
II.

The Evolution of the Real Estate Broker's Duty to Inspect
Homes for Sale
As the doctrine of consumer protection evolved, courts have been
especially willing to compensate purchasers who have suffered physoperations," in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 268 (1981). The Court held that coal was a commodity that moves
in interstate commerce. See id. at 282. Also, the Court observed that "lower federal
courts have uniformly found the power conferred by the commerce clause broad
enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution,
or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State."
Id. (footnote omitted).
Radon in homes affects interstate commerce since people who move from state
to state frequently purchase homes. In fact, homebuyers moving from one state
are less likely to know about radon's presence in another state and have a greater
need for protection. Thus, the means to be adopted by Congress-imposition on
brokers of the duty to test for radon-is reasonably adapted to the end of providing
adequate information to unwary homebuyers.
31. See infra notes 159-77 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 88-158 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 40-87 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 88-158 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 159-233 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 234-78 and accompanying text.
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ical injury in addition to economic loss. A home represents both a
major investment and a source of security to a homebuyer-who
often buys only one home in his lifetime. Thus, to protect homebuyers, courts have gradually expanded the list of people charged
with a duty of due care owed to a prospective homebuyer.
A. The Decline of Caveat Emptor and the Advent of Consumer
Protection
The doctrine of caveat emptor originally governed commercial
transactions. 40 Literally, "let the buyer beware," caveat emptor ex-

horted a purchaser to examine an item and judge its quality for
himself, because the item carried no warranty. 4' As commercially
manufactured goods began to be mass-produced, courts modified

the doctrine in order to protect the public from exposure to dangerous
42
products and to ensure manufacturing quality.

43
In the area of real estate, however, caveat emptor persisted.

Absent an express agreement to the contrary, a seller was not liable
for defects in property." The underlying rationale was that the
purchaser had ample opportunity to inspect the property and had
45
the ability to detect defects before the sale.

40. See generally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults
Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961) [hereinafter Caveat Emptor]; Hamilton,
The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931) [hereinafter The
Ancient Maxim]; Note, When the Walls Come Tumbling Down-Theories of Recovery for Defective Housing, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 670, 682-93 (1982) [hereinafter
When the Walls Come Tumbling Down].
41. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979). One writer has referred

to the doctrine of caveat emptor as "[tihe refusal of public authority, through
legislature and judiciary, to accord effective protection to the purchaser." The
Ancient Maxim, supra note 40, at 1135.
42. See generally Caveat Emptor, supra note 40, at 541.
43. See When the Walls Come Tumbling Down, supra note 40, at 682-83.

Significantly, the definition in Black's Law Dictionary states that the maxim of
caveat emptor is more applicable to judicial sales than to sales of consumer goods
"where strict liability, warranty, and other consumer protection laws protect the
consumer-buyer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979). The definition
does not mention realty. See id.
44. See When the Walls Come Tumbling Down, supra note 40, at 683.

45. See id. at 685. The belief that the purchaser had ample opportunity to
inspect the premises before the sale originated in the merger doctrine, which divided
land sales into two steps. See id. First, the parties entered "into a contract of sale
defining their rights and obligations." Id. Later, one party tendered, and the other
party accepted, the deed. See id. Only contractual warranties of fitness and quality
that were explicitly included in the deed would determine the purchaser's future
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Concerned with the harsh results of the caveat emptor doctrine
in real estate transactions, 46 courts steadily began giving more protection to homebuyers. 47 As mass-produced, poorly built homes proliferated after World War II, liability was imposed on negligent
4
builder-vendors in order to protect buyers from personal injury. 1
To support these policy-based decisions, courts have applied the
reasoning of products liability cases to the area of defective housing.
In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. 9 for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court found a builder-vendor liable for negligence in designing and installing a hot water system without a mixing valve

rights. See id.
The notion that a purchaser had an opportunity to inspect before the completion
of the sale dates back to a time when the buyer and seller came from the same
community. See Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular
Purpose, 37 MINN. L. REV. 108, 110 (1953).
46. See, e.g., City of Aurora v. Green, 126 Ill. App. 3d 684, 467 N.E.2d 610
(1984) (buyer of apartment building described by seller as complying with zoning
ordinances had no recourse when zoning ordinance limited building to fewer units
than contained in building); O'Brien v. Noble, 106 Ill. App. 3d 126, 435 N.E.2d
554 (1982) (buyer had no recourse when five-acre lot sold as site for construction
of home while zoning prohibited all construction).
47. See Caveat Emptor, supra note 40, at 542-43, for a discussion of policy
reasons for abandoning the doctrine of caveat emptor in home sales. The author
points out that in the area of real estate, the expectations of the public differ
widely from the rule of law. See id. at 541-42. The public is accustomed to buying
merchandise with an implied warranty of merchantibility and fitness based upon
such consumer protection statutes as the Uniform Commercial Code. See id. The
public, therefore, expects protection in real estate transactions, which typically
involve significantly more money than do ordinary consumer transactions. See id.
Thus, the unwitting real estate purchaser is often startled by the fact that the law
offers no protection in the form of a warranty of quality or warranty of fitness.
See id.

48. See Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd on
other grounds, 240 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (homebuyer injured when stairway
came unbolted and threw her to ground). Explaining its abandonment of caveat
emptor, the court relied upon the buyer's lack of expertise, the buyer's reliance,
and the need to prevent builders from unnecessarily injuring homebuyers:
The ordinary purchaser is not in a position to discover a latent defect
by inspection, no matter how thorough his scrutiny may be, because
usually he lacks sufficient familiarity with the complexities of building
construction and the intricacies of applicable regulations. He should be
able to rely on the skill of the builder who sells the house ....
[T]he
builder should be liable for injuries caused by his negligence ....
Any
other result would ... encourage unscrupulous builders who may be

tempted to reduce their costs and increase their profits by palming off
defective and inferior construction on their customers.
Id. at 16; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).
49. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), limited, 172 N.J. Super. 93, 96-7, 410
A.2d 1184, 1186 (1980).
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which would have prevented excessively hot water from injuring the
child of the purchaser's lessee.5 0
Analogizing the builder to a manufacturer whose product consists
of component parts supplied by others, the court relied on the
landmark products liability case, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.5"
and its progeny. 2 The court held that the hot water faucet was a
dangerously concealed item which the occupant and his invitees"
could not have discovered through a casual visual inspection.14 The
vendor knew that when the water was turned on it flowed at a
dangerously high temperature." Moreover, the vendor could have
repaired the faucet at minimal expense, thereby preventing exposure
6
of the plaintiffs and their guests to an unreasonable risk of harm.1
In the area of home sales between owners and purchasers, courts
have usually disregarded the doctrine of caveat emptor" and held
liable for intentional misrepresentation" vendors who have made
an intentionally false statement that induced the buyer into a real
estate transaction. 9 As a remedy, they allow rescission or damages
or both.60 When a seller has unintentionally made a false statement
and the buyer has relied on the statement, some courts have allowed
rescission but have eliminated the damages because of the vendor's
lack of scienter and therefore intent. 61 Some jurisdictions have found
an affirmative duty to disclose a material defect that was not discoverable upon inspection by a vendee who with the vendor's knowledge, was relying on the vendor's statement. 62 Presuming that sellers
are in a better position than are buyers to know about their property

50. See id. at 88, 207 A.2d at 320.
51. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
52. See, e.g., Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958);
Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d
705 (1961).
53. Since the cause of action was for negligence, the vendor's liability extended
to those who might foreseeably be injured by his breach of duty. See Schipper,
44 N.J. at 95, 207 A.2d at 328.

54. See id. at 87, 207 A.2d at 323-24.
55. See id. at 78, 207 A.2d at 318.
56. See id. at 78, 207 A.2d at 319.
57. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text, for discussion of misrepresentation in the broker-buyer relationship.
59. See generally Caveat Emptor, supra note 40, at 561.
60. See id. at 562.
61. See id..
62. See id. at 561 & n.95.
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and its physical characteristics, some courts have imposed a duty
63
on the seller to investigate and know his property.

B. The Broker's Duty to Inspect and Disclose Defects in
Property for Sale
64
Because the broker was historically in privity with only the seller,
he had no fiduciary obligations to prospective purchasers. 65 Increasingly recognizing the need to protect homebuyers, however, courts
further eroded the doctrine of caveat emptor, 66 and began to examine
the relationship between the buyer and the seller's broker in the

real estate transaction. 67 Some courts have found duties 6 running
from brokers to prospective purchasers and have imposed liability
based on a number of existing doctrines, most notably,
misrepresentation 69 and negligence.70
1.

Misrepresentation
Courts have traditionally permitted buyers to recover from brokers

in actions for intentional misrepresentation. To prevail in a cause
of action for intentional misrepresentation, the buyer must prove:

63. See, e.g., Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980) (" 'owner is
presumed to know the boundaries of his own land, the quantity of his acreage,
and the amount of water available. If he does not know the correct information,
he must find out' ") (quoting Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 715, 571 P.2d
769, 776 (1977)). See generally Freyfogel, Real Estate Sales and the New Implied
Warranty of Lawful Use, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19 n.70 (1985) [hereinafter Implied
Warranty of Lawful Use].
64. Since the broker is the seller's agent, he has a fiduciary duty to act for
his principal alone, and to use the utmost good faith in his efforts on the seller's
behalf. See Note, Real Estate Broker's Duties to Prospective Purchasers, B.Y.U.
L. REV. 513, 513-14 (1976) [hereinafter Broker's Duties]; see also Note, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L.
REv. 1343, 1343-44 (1972) [hereinafter Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship].
65. Since the seller's relationship to the buyer is defined by the doctrine of
caveat emptor, see supra notes 40-42, the broker, as the seller's agent, owes the
buyer no fiduciary obligation. See Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, supra note 64,
at 1345.
66. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
67. See generally Caveat Emptor, supra note 40; Note, Imposing Tort Liability
on Real Estate Brokers Selling Defective Housing, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1861 (1986)
[hereinafter Imposing Tort Liability]; When the Walls Come Tumbling Down,
supra, note 40; see also Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, supra note 64, at 1343.
68. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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(1) the broker made a false representation; (2) the broker knew the
misrepresentation was false (the scienter requirement); (3) the broker
intended the buyer to rely on the representation; (4) the buyer
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation; and (5) such reliance
caused damage to the buyer. 7
Frequently, the buyer has difficulty proving the elements of the

cause of action, especially the requirement that the broker knowingly
misrepresented the property. 72 Commentators, however, have suggested that a false statement of material fact made without knowledge
of its truth or falsity or without adequate investigation of its veracity
is the equivalent of intentional misrepresentation." Thus, to lighten
the buyer's burden of proof, some courts have relaxed the scienter
requirement and allowed recovery to buyers who can prove that a
broker negligently misrepresented the property. 74 In other jurisdic-

tions, courts have eliminated the need to prove the broker's knowledge and intent; the buyer need prove only justifiable reliance on
the broker's misrepresentation. 75 Finally, some courts find misre77
presentation in silence 76 -if the defendant has a duty to speak.

71. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 105-108, at 725-54 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS]; see also Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 738, 29
Cal. Rptr. 201, 206 (1963) (broker liable in fraudulent concealment for failure to
disclose defect); Imposing Tort Liability, supra note 67, at 1862-63.
72. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 71, § 107, at 741-45; Implied
Warranty of Lawful Use, supra note 63, at 18 n.68 (discussing range of broker
knowledge allowed by courts).
73. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 71, § 107, at 741-45.
74. See, e.g., First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty Inc.,
19 Wash. App. 275, 281, 574 P.2d 1211, 1215 (1978) (court found agent negligent
for failing to ascertain property for sale; broker then represented incorrect boundaries
to purchaser); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552c(1) (1977); PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 71, § 107, at 740-49.
75. See Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 763 (Alaska 1982) (broker who passed
on information that well on property worked liable for innocent misrepresentation
based upon policy that real estate brokers possess superior knowledge of realty
sold and that buyers recognize and rely on this expertise).
76. See, e.g., Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1963) (nondisclosure of termites); Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365, 358
A.2d 473 (App. Div. 1976) (same); Crum v. McCoy, 41 Ohio Misc. 34 (1974)
(nondisclosure of defective sewer).
77. One court set forth the reasons underlying the duty to speak:
While silence or concealment becomes fraudulent only where there is
a duty to speak and disclose, a legal duty to disclose may exist where
there is no existing fiduciary relationship between the parties and where
no special confidence is expressly reposed. The duty to disclose may arise
from the circumstances of the case, including inequality of condition and
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Negligence

Some courts have eliminated entirely the need to prove the elements

79
of misrepresentation"8 by allowing the buyer to sue in negligence.

In a cause of action for negligence, the buyer must prove: (1) the
broker owed him a legal duty of reasonable care; 0 (2) the broker
breached the duty;8 1 and (3) the breach proximately caused injury
to the buyer. One of the aspects of the broker's duty of care is to

foresee harm that might result from his actions.8 2 He therefore has
an affirmative duty to speak when he knows of facts that reasonably

may cause harm to the plaintiff.83
In some jurisdictions, the legislature has defined the broker's duty
4
of reasonable care by enacting statutes to protect homebuyers.1

the superior knowledge of one party, which knowledge is not within the
fair and reasonable reach of the other party.
Jones v. Arnold, 359 Mo. 161, 169, 221 S.W.2d 187, 193 (1949) (quoted in Maples
v. Porath, 638 S.W.2d 337, 340 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
If the broker owes an implied duty to speak and disclose, then silence may
constitute a breach of duty under the doctrine of negligence as well as under the
doctrine of negligent or innocent misrepresentation. See Imposing Tort Liability,
supra note 67, at 1863 n.15.
78. See supra notes 71-77.
79. See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984)
(real estate broker held liable for negligent failure to conduct reasonably competent
and diligent inspection of property subject to landslides). See generally PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 71, § 30, at 164-68 (listing elements of negligence
cause of action); Imposing Tort Liability, supra note 67, at 1864-66 (discussing
negligence cause of 'action as alternative to misrepresentation cause of action) see
also infra notes 80-158 and accompanying text.
80. See Earp v. Nobmann, 122 Cal. App. 3d 270, 289-90, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767,
778 (1981).
81. Some appropriate general criteria for determining breach of duty of care
are: (1) how much the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) foreseeability of harm; (3) degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury; (4) relationship between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury; (5) moral culpability
of defendant's conduct; and (6) policy of preventing future harm. See J'Aire Corp.
v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 804, 598 P.2d 60, 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 410 (1979).
See infra notes 157-58, 169-77 and accompanying text, for a discussion of specialized
duty of care of broker as professional.
82. See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383,
390 (1984) (for benefit of prospective homebuyers broker has affirmative duty to
investigate property for latent defects).
83. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. See generally Imposing Tort
Liability, supra note 67, at 1863-64.
84. See, e.g., Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 261-272 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.68
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
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Certain courts construe statutes and regulations to find the obligations
of brokers to prospective purchasers based on the nature of the

broker-buyer relationship.85 In other jurisdictions, when no statute
explicitly requires a broker to disclose information, courts have
derived the duty from general consumer protection statutes 6 and

from the Code of Ethics for real estate brokers.87
Expansion of the Broker's Duty to Disclose Defects
Most courts have imposed liability on brokers for failure to disclose
known defects.8" Moreover, California courts have recently expanded
broker liability for failure to investigate property for sale and disclose
not only known defects but also unknown defects.8 9
In George Ball Pacific, Inc. v. Coldwell Banker & Co. ,90 the court
C.

held a lessee's broker 9' liable for both breach of fiduciary duty and
negligence for failing to discover the true owner of the building,
which was held in a sale-leaseback. 92 When the lessor went bankrupt,
85. See, e.g., Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 38485, 432 N.E.2d 849, 851 (1982) (imposing duty to disclose self-interest in transaction
based on regulation promulgated pursuant to Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen
License Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 5701-5743 (Smith-Hurd 1977)).
86. See, e.g., Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 248-49, 407 N.E.2d
352, 355 (1980) (under state deceptive practices statute, broker must disclose material
facts that could influence buyer); McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173, 176-77,
646 P.2d 771, 774-75 (1982) (under consumer protection statute broker has duty
to disclose matters known to him; broker must use care to ascertain conditions
of property before listing), aff'd, remanded, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496
(1984).
87. See Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 472-73 (Iowa 1985) (violation of
Code of Ethics of National Association of Realtors requiring brokers to discover
adverse factors that reasonably competent and diligent investigation would disclose
provides evidence of negligence in malpractice action).
88. See, e.g., Earp v. Nobmann, 122 Cal. App. 3d 270, 290, 175 Cal. Rptr.
767, 779 (1981) (broker liable for negligence for failure to disclose); Cooper v.
Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865-66, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976) (broker liable
for fraud for failure to disclose); Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 73536, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-205 (1963) (broker liable for negligence for failure to
disclose); Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365, 375, 358 A.2d 473, 478 (App.
Div. 1976) (broker liable for nondisclosure of termite infestation); see also supra
notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 90-158 and accompanying text.
90. 117 Cal. App. 3d 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1981).
91. Since the broker represented the lessee, he had a fiduciary duty to disclose
material facts that might affect his principal's decision to rent the property. See
id. at 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 601. At the same time, the court found a professional
duty to conform to the community standard of care which included an affirmative
investigation into record title holders. See id. at 255-56, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
92. See id. at 254, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 600. A sale-leaseback is a "sale of an
asset to a vendee who immediately leases back to the vendor." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1202 (5th ed. 1979).
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the true owner of the building forced the plaintiff to renegotiate
the lease at a higher price. 93 The sale-leaseback was known to the
brokerage community. 94 Also, it was the custom in the area for a
broker to inform a lessee of the actual record title holder of property. 95

Although the broker had made no affirmative representations, the
court held that he had failed to comply with the community practice
of determining the record holder of the property and providing the
information to the lessee. 96 Thus, the broker breached his fiduciary
duty to the lessor and negligently failed to discover and disclose
material facts. 97
In Pepper v. Underwood,98 a broker9 9 used summaries of income
tax information provided by the sellers of a motel to figure prof-

itability for the purchaser, 1°° Relying on the information, the purchaser decided to buy the motel. 10 1 Although the broker later had
reason to suspect the information was incorrect, he remained silent. 102
The court held that the Code of Ethics of the National Association
of Realtors could serve as rebuttable evidence of the standard of
conduct in the community for real estate brokers. 03 The court
recommended that the Code be used as a guide in the retrial of
the case.104

93.. See 117 Cal. App. 3d at 254, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
94. See id. at 255, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
95. See id. at 255, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
96. See id. at 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
97. See id. at 256-57, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
98. 48 Cal. App. 3d 698, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1975).
99. Originally, the broker was the seller's broker, and the court held that although
he received a commission from the seller, he was also the buyer's broker, and
therefore owed the buyer a fiduciary duty. See id. at 712-13, 122 Cal. Rptr. at
353-54.
100. See id. at 704, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48.
101. The purchaser called the information his
'bible'." Id. at 704, 122 Cal.
Rptr. at 347 (quoting purchaser). In reliance on the information, he quit his job,
sold his house and moved to the motel. See id.
102. Both the salesman's employer and the prior owners told the salesman that
the expenses were obviously low. See id. at 705, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
103. See id. at 715, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
104. See id. While the court did not cite to a specific section of the Code, one
commentator has noted that Article 9 of the Code of Ethics would impose upon
realtors an affirmative obligation to discover adverse factors that a reasonably
competent and diligent investigation would disclose. See Note, Real Estate Brokers

Liability -for Failure to Disclose: A New Duty to Investigate, 17 PAC. L.J. 327,
335 (1985); see also Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 472 (Iowa 1985) (Code
used to establish community standards to determine whether broker acted negligently;
violation of standards constituted evidence of negligence); National Ass'n of Realtors,
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Thus, in both George Ball and Pepper, the court held that a

broker has an obligation to find out certain information about
property in order to protect the unwary buyer."' While the court
narrowly based liability on the specific facts of each case," °6 the
expansion of the duty signals a policy of compensating the injured
buyer for losses that an investigation by the broker before the closing
would have prevented.
07 the California Court of Appeals for
In Easton v. Strassburger,1

the first time'0s imposed general liability on two real estate brokers
who had failed to disclose a defect that was not known to the
defendant. 0 9 Before the decision in Easton, brokers had no general
duty to investigate property for sale and to disclose material defects
to purchasers." 0 The brokers listed a home built on fill that had
not been properly engineered and compacted."' The sellers failed to
tell the brokers about past landslides or about subsequent remedial
2
action that they had taken."

Several times before the sale, the brokers' agents inspected the
property." 3 The court found evidence that they were aware of "red
' 4 that should have indicated soil problems." 5 Deprived of
flags ""

Code of Ethics, art. 9 (1974). See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text for
California Court of Appeals' application of the National Association of Realtors
Code of Ethics to determine the standard of care in negligence cases.
105. See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
106. See id.
107. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
108. See id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. The court stated: "Admittedly, no
appellate division has explicitly declared that a broker is under a duty to disclose
material facts which he should have known." Id.
109. See id. at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
110. See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text for discussion of additional
California precedents, which the Easton court failed to mention in its decision.
111. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
112. See id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92. The California Association of Realtors
defined "red flag" as a " 'readily observable "sign" (indicator) of a potential
problem .... Brokers must be aware of the facts and circumstances (unique in

each case) concerning the property in question and follow their instinct in pointing
out all "red flags".' " Note, Easton v. Strassburger: Judicial Imposition of a
Duty to Inspect on California Real Estate Brokers, 18 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 809, 850
(1985) [hereinafter Judicial Imposition of a Duty to Inspect] (quoting memorandum
from California Association of Realtors providing guidelines to real estate brokers
for following Easton).
115. See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. One or both
of the agents knew the home was built on fill and that settlement and erosion
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adequate warning of the soil problems, the buyers purchased the
home." 6 Shortly after the sale, a massive earth movement and sub11 7
sequent landslides damaged the property.
Relying on a theory of common law negligence, the Easton court
held that a broker representing the seller" 8 of a home" 9 has an

"affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent

inspection of the residential property listed for sale and to disclose

to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or
desirability of the property that such an investigation would re-

veal. '' 210
The court in part derived the duty to disclose material facts
discovered during an inspection 21 from the duty to disclose known
24
material defects. 22 In Cooper v. Jevne23 and Lingsch v. Savage,

problems were associated with such soil. See id. In addition to observing repair
netting on a recent slide, one agent observed that the floor on the premises was
not level, and the other agent testified that uneven floors indicate soil problems.
See id. at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The court thought the agents should have
investigated further through a soils report or an inquiry: "The jury merely had
to conclude ...

that a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the property

would have uncovered the past history of soils problems." Id. at 104, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 391-92 (emphasis in original).
116. See id. at 97, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
117. See id. at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
118. No privity of contract existed between the seller's broker and the buyer.
See id. at 98 n.2, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387 n.2. Nonetheless, the court in Easton
cited two cases to support the rule that a broker has a duty to exercise reasonable
care to a buyer even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship. Id. (citing Merrill
v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 561-62, 375 P.2d 304, 310, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456, 462 (1962));
Earp v. Nobmann, 122 Cal. App. 3d 270, 290, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767, 772 (1981).
119. The court distinguished the duty of a broker selling commercial property
from that of a broker selling residential property. See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d
at 102 n.8, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.8. The court defined the difference in terms
of the buyer's inexperience and lack of representation: "Unlike the residential home
buyer who is often unrepresented by a broker, or is effectively unrepresented
because of the problems of dual agency, a purchaser of commercial real estate is
likely to be more experienced and sophisticated in his dealings in real estate and
is usually represented by an agent who represents only the buyer's interests." Id.
(citations omitted).
120. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (footnote omitted).
121. See id. at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387. The court instructed the jury on the
realtor's duty of care: "A real estate broker is a licensed person or entity who
holds himself out to the public as having particular skills and knowledge in the
real estate field. He is under a duty to disclose facts materially affecting the value
or desirability of the property that are known to him or which through reasonable
diligence should be known to him." Id.
122. See id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
123. 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976).
124. 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963).

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XV

two California courts had previously imposed a duty to disclose
known material facts. The Easton court-although noting that the
Cooper case was based on fraud-praised Cooper for having most
clearly articulated the rule:
It is the law of this state that where a real estate broker or agent,
representing the seller, knows facts materially affecting the value
or the desirability of property offered for sale and these facts
are known or accessible only to him and his principal, and the
broker or agent also knows that these facts are not known to or
within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the
buyer, the broker or agent is under a duty to disclose-these facts
to the buyer.' 25
The court in Easton expanded the broker's fraud-based CooperLingsch duty to disclose to include negligence. 2 6 A finding of fraud

requires that the plaintiff prove that the defendant had actual
knowledge 27 and that the facts "[were] not known to or within the
'2
reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer.'
Under the Easton rule then, the plaintiff need not prove that the

29
broker had either actual or constructive knowledge of the defect.
Moreover, the plaintiff's potential access to knowledge of the defect
does not affect the cause of action. 3 0 Instead, a finding of negligence
merely requires a legal duty' 3' to inspect running from the defendant
to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and injury proximately
32
resulting from the breach.1
The Easton court based the broker's duty to inspect property for
sale in: (1) a policy to protect homebuyers; 33 (2) the nature of the

125. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387
(1984) (quoting Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724,
727 (1976) (summarizing holding in Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 723, 729,
29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (1963))).
126. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
127. See id.
128. See id. (quoting Cooper, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 727).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The court did not, however, eliminate
the duty of the buyer "to exercise reasonable care to protect himself," and noted
the availability of contributory negligence as a defense when the plaintiff is egregiously careless. Id.
131. See id. at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387. "Whether a defendant owes a duty
of due care to a particular plaintiff is a question of law." Id. See infra notes 7987 and accompanying text for a discussion of the broker's duty to the homebuyer.
132. See 152 Cal. App. 3d at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
133. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
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broker-buyer relationship; 3 4 and (3) the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Realtors. 3 5 First, the court noted that one of
the purposes of the duty to disclose reasonably discoverable defects
is to protect homebuyers from unethical brokers and sellers. 36 Another purpose of imposing such a duty is to give purchasers enough
information to decide intelligently whether to purchase particular
property. 37 Without such a duty, the court reasoned, a broker would
have a strong disincentive to inspect. 3 ' Moreover, he could avoid
39
liability by claiming ignorance.
The court also found the duty to disclose to be based on the
nature of the broker-buyer relationship, 14 0 even though brokers represent sellers.' 14 Since the broker's interest is closer to that of the
seller's interest, 42 the buyer needs extra protection. 43 The homebuyer's reliance can encompass crucial issues like quality of title and
condition of the premises. 44 Furthermore, the broker holds himself
out to the buyer as a professional with skill and knowledge of the
real estate field. 145 As a result of the broker's strong involvement
and initiative in the selling process, the inexperienced buyer may
perceive the broker as having greater expertise 46 than his own and
134. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
136. See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. The court noted that despite the lack
of privity of contract between the broker and homebuyer, the broker has a duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect those whom the agent is trying to induce
into entering a real estate transaction for the purpose of earning a commission.
Id. at 98 n.2, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387 n.2.
142. See id. at 101 n.4, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389 n.4. " 'Where the buyer is
unappreciative of the potentially divided loyalty of the broker, he may be lulled
into relying on the broker to his significant detriment.' " Id. (quoting Sinclair,
The Duty of the Broker to Purchasersand Prospective Purchasersof Real Property
in Illinois, 69 ILL. B.J. 260, 263-64 (1981)).
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 104-05, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392. For example, the broker advises
the buyer on the value and fitness of a home as well as on financing. Id. at 101
n.4, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389 n.4 (quoting Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, supra
note 64, at 1343).
146. Id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. The real estate broker " 'is accredited
by his calling in the minds of the inexperienced or ignorant with a knowledge
greater than their own.' " Id. (quoting Roman v. Lobe, 243 N.Y. 51, 54-55, 152
N.E. 461, 462 (1926), quoted in Richards Realty Co. v. Real Estate Comm'r, 144
Cal. App. 2d 357, 300 P.2d 893 (1956)).
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therefore grow to rely on him.'4 7 In some cases, the buyer may
149
1 48
believe the broker protects his interests or even represents him.

Pointing out that the buyer's basis for such reliance is illusory, 50
the court sought to protect the unwary buyer from potentially substantial injury. 5 ' The court concluded that the broker can greatly
benefit the buyer by conducting a diligent search of the property
for sale. 5 2 The court reasoned that most of the time the broker,

as a professional,'53 is in a better position than is the buyer to
54

discover information about the property.'
The court in Easton' 55 also found in the Code of Ethics of the

National Association of Realtors an explicit duty to discover and
disclose material defects.' 5 6 As part of his professional obligation,
the broker "must not only 'avoid ... concealment of pertinent
facts' " but " 'has an affirmative obligation to discover adverse
factors that a reasonably competent and diligent investigation would

147. See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 100-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89. The
court cited several propositions as sources of the buyer's reliance and trust. See
id. Since houses are purchased infrequently, the buyer is relatively inexperienced
at knowing what to look for during his search. See id. In contrast, the buyer sees
the broker as having the wisdom of experience in determining value and fitness.
See id. The broker not only orchestrates all phases of the purchase but also helps
the buyer to obtain financing, which can be a complex process. See id. Again,
the inexperienced buyer sees the broker as having greater expertise. See id.
148. See id at 100-01, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389. The court stated that "many
buyers in fact justifiably believe the seller's broker is also protecting their interest
in securing and acting upon accurate information." Id. (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
149. See id. at 101 n.4, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389 n.4.
150. See id. at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
151. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
152. See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
153. See id. (noting that brokers are " 'supposed to possess ordinary professional
knowledge concerning the .. . natural characteristics of the property' ") (quoting

Brady v. Carman, 179 Cal. App. 2d 63, 68, 3 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (1960)).
154. See id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. "[Iun residential sales transactions
the seller's broker is most frequently the best situated to obtain and provide the
most reliable information on the property and is ordinarily counted on to do so."
Id.
155. The court noted that according to the California Evidence Code, it may
take judicial notice of criteria published by a private professional association. See
id. at 102 n.5, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389 n.5. These criteria establish the requisite
standard of behavior for a realtor. See id. In addition, the court noted that many
brokers have formally acknowledged the professional responsibility to conduct a
reasonable investigation of listed property before a sale, even absent privity of
contract. See id.
156. See id. at 101-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90; National Ass'n of Realtors,
Interpretations of the Code of Ethics, art. 9 (7th ed. 1978).
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disclose.' "I" The court noted that the duty to inspect applies to
all agents, regardless of whether they are association members governed by the Code of Ethics. 5 8
III.

The Broker's Duty to Test for Radon

Previous cases holding brokers liable to homebuyers'5 9 provide a
framework for analyzing broker liability in negligence for failure to
test for and disclose the presence of radon to prospective pur6
chasers. 60 To prevail in an action for intentional misrepresentation,1 1
the buyer must prove that the broker intentionally 62 made a false
statement; similarly, to prevail in an action for negligent misrepresentation, 63 he must prove that the broker made the statement
negligently. 164 In a radon liability case based on fraud, however, a
buyer may have difficulty proving the extent of the seller's knowledge
and his intent to misrepresent. 65 In contrast, the court in a negligence
action has to determine the extent of the duty of care that the
broker owes to a particular plaintiff, 66 a breach of that duty, and
67
harm proximately caused to the plaintiff.

157. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (quoting National
Ass'n of Realtors, Interpretations of the Code of Ethics art. 9 (7th ed, 1978)).
The court cites an example from the Code of Ethics of a violation of the duty
to discover adverse factors that a reasonable investigation would reveal. See id. at
102 n.6, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389 n.6. The Committee held that theabsence of a
sewer connection in an area where all other houses were connected was a substantial
and pertinent fact. See id. The fact that the broker offered as a defense his
ignorance that the house was not connected, and that he had never represented
the house as being connected, did not excuse his' failure to ascertain that the
previous owners had failed to connect the house to the sewer system. See id. at
101-102 n.6, 199 Cal. Rptr. 389-90 n.6 (quoting National Ass'n of Realtors, Interpretations of the Code of Ethics art. 9 (7th ed. 1978)).
158. See id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390; see also Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d
465, 473 (Iowa 1985) (using violation of Code of Ethics as evidence of negligence).
159, See supra notes 71-158 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
164. See id.
165. See Real Estate Transactions and Radon, N.Y.L.J., July 15, 1987, at 2,
col. 6 (real estate broker who has actual knowledge of radon's presence but fails
to disclose could be held liable for concealment of a latent defect) [hereinafter Real
Estate Transactions and Radon]; see also Implied Warranty of Lawful Use, supra
note 63, at 18-19.
166. See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
167. See id.
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The California court in Easton was the first to impose on brokers
the general affirmative duty to investigate property for sale and to
disclose latent defects to prospective purchasers. 6 ' In other jurisdictions, however, courts have imposed various duties based on the
standard of professional care required of a broker. 169 For example,

some courts use the standards set forth in the Code of Ethics of
the National Association of Realtors, which require brokers to dis-

cover adverse factors that a reasonably competent and diligent investigation would disclose. 170 Some states require prospective brokers
71
to study the Code of Ethics to prepare for the licensing exam.'
Other jurisdictions simply view the licensing process as the granting

of a "state-created monopoly' '1 72 that requires a higher ethical and
73
professional duty of care to the public.

168. See supra notes 107-10 and. accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Baker v. Leight, 91 Ariz. 112, 117-18, 370 P.2d 268, 271 (1962)
("[i]t is immaterial as to whether the broker is a member of the National Association
if it is definitely established that this Association's Code of Ethics has been adopted
and is applicable to those in the real estate profession in this state"); Pepper v.
Underwood, 48 Cal. App. 3d 698, 714, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343, 355 (1975) ("upon
proper proof that the Canons of Ethics adopted by the National Association of
Real Estate Agents established standards of conduct to be adhered to and which
were adhered to by real estate brokers and agents in the Santa Barbara area, such
canons would be admissible as rebuttable evidence of such standard of care"),
overruled on other grounds sub nom. Stout v. Turney, 22 Cal. 3d 718, 730, 586

P.2d 1228, 1235, 150 Cal. Rptr. 637, 644 (1978); Hoefer v. Wilckens, 684 P.2d
468, 472 (Mont. 1984) (trial court's findings of specific acts or omissions constituting
broker malpractice "based largely on the standard of care required of realtors in
Lake County under the Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice of the National
Association of Realtors").
171. See, e.g., Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 472 (Iowa 1985) ("National
Association of Realtors Code of Ethics [established] as accepted standards in the
profession and required study for, and included in, the written examinations leading
to licensing in Iowa").
172. See id. at 474 (citing Milholin v. Vorhies, 320 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa
1982)).
173. See, e.g., Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 98, 25 So. 2d 4, 4-5 (1946) ("[the
state ...

has prescribed a high standard of qualifications and by the same law

granted a form of monopoly and in so doing the old rule of caveat emptor is
cast aside. Those dealing with a licensed broker may naturally assume that he
possesses the requisites of an honest, ethical man"); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d
1239, 1248 (Utah 1980) ("[iun this state, .

.

. the rule of caveat emptor does not

apply to those dealing with a licensed real estate agent. Though not occupying a
fiduciary relationship with prospective purchasers, a real estate agent hired by the
vendor is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law
for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the public"); Hagar v. Mobley, 638
P.2d 127, 138 (Wyo. 1981) ("[r]ealtors, just like doctors, lawyers, engineering
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According to one respected authority, brokers as a profession
generally "must all use care which is reasonable in light of their
superior learning and experience, and any special skills, knowledge
or training they may personally have over and above what is normally
possessed by persons in the field."'1 7 4 Moreover, as a reasonable

person, a real estate broker "stand[s] in a relation to others, which
imposes on him an obligation to investigate and find out, so that
[he] becomes liable not so much for being ignorant as for remaining
17 6
ignorant."'' 75 More specifically, real estate brokers should know
17
the property they market.
A.

Notice to Brokers of the Presence of Radon

By fulfilling their professional responsibility to buyers and sellers
to keep abreast of news of phenomena that can affect the value or
safety of property,' 78 brokers will become aware of radon as posing

a serious threat that may lower the value of a home and render it
hazardous to the health of its occupants. 79 Currently, brokers may
learn about radon through lay and trade publications and professional

associations. For several years, national newspapers have been reporting on radon,8 0 both as a health threat to home occupants'
consultants, and builders, hold themselves out as professionals; it is their job to
know their profession. People rely on and trust them. Failure to comply with either
the accepted standards in the field or the standards society is willing to recognize

as acceptable, is actionable").
174. In general, professionals must exercise reasonable care in what they do. See
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 71, § 32, at 185-93. Moreover, they
must possess a minimum standard of special knowledge and ability in their field.
See id.
175. Id. § 32, at 185.
176. The words "should know" denote that a reasonably intelligent and prudent

person or a person of the superior intelligence of the actor would ascertain the
fact in question or would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact
exists. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 785 (5th ed. 1979) (paraphrasing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 (1966)). For example, the occupant of premises who invites
business visitors to enter is charged with the duty of affirmative action which a
reasonable person would take to discover potential dangers. See PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS, supra note 71, § 32, at 185.
177. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 120, 169-77 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
180. For example, The New York Times has published a minimum of 30 articles
covering various aspects of the problem. See infra notes 181-90 and accompanying
text.

181. See, e.g., Radon: Threat is Real, but Scientists Argue Over Its Severity,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1986, at Cl, col. 1; Radon: The Risks and the Remedies,
N.Y. Times, May 17, 1986, at 30, col. 4.
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across the country'8 2 and as a potential source of broker liability in
real estate transactions.' 83
Attorneys specializing in real estate law currently recognize radon
as an evolving legal predicament. 8 4 As a matter of professional
responsibility, attorneys have been warning clients of this potential
source of liability. 8 ' Conversely, real estate brokers ought to keep
abreast of current phenomena that are potentially dangerous to
18 7
others 8 6 who may later sue them for resulting injuries.

Professionals indirectly involved in the real estate transaction have
been taking precautions to prevent losses resulting from the possible
discovery of radon after title passes. Fearing sudden property devaluation resulting from the discovery of radon, lending banks have
been requiring tests as a condition to getting a mortgage. 8 In
addition, real estate trade associations have become increasingly

182. See, e.g., 10 State Survey Finds Peril From Radon in 1 in 5 Homes, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at A14, col. 1; Radon Counts Are High in 3 Upstate Counties,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1986, at 54, col. 4; Effort To Estimate Levels of Radon
Raising Concern in New England, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1986, at 68, col, 1; Levels

of Radon In Jersey Town Exceed Limits: An Entire Neighborhood Affected by
Problem, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1986, at B4, col. 6.

183. See, e.g., New Accountability for Realty Agents: Coast Case Raises Their
Liability for Defects in Property, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1986, at 22, col. 3 (California
claims adjusting expert, Frederick J. Fisher, commented: "it is only a matter of
time before similar suits start occurring elsewhere in the country, probably in the
Northeast involving radon contamination"); see also Big Increase Expected In Radon
Pollution Suits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, at 54, col. 1.

184. See, e.g., Real Estate Transactions and Radon, supra note 165, at 1, col.
1; Lawyers Grapple With Radon Issue, supra note 3, at 1, col. 4; Radon Testing,
Case Law Unclear, N.J.L.J., May 22, 1986, at 22, col. 3; see also Tens of Thousands

of Homeowners Check for Indoor Radon in Response to Information, Direction
from State, Federal Regulators, Env't Rep. (BNA) 928-29 (Oct. 17, 1986).
185. See supra note 184.
186. See generally Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314
(1965), limited, 172 N.J. Super. 93, 96, 410 A.2d 1184, 1186 (1980).
187. The Code of Professional Ethics states that a realtor " 'should endeavor
always to be informed regarding laws, proposed legislation, governmental regulations
• .. in order to be in a position to advise his clients properly.' " Menzel v. Morse,
362 N.W.2d 465, 469 (Iowa 1985) (quoting National Ass'n of Realtors, Interpretations of the Code of Ethics, art. 2 (7th ed. 1978)); see also Implied Warranty
of Lawful Use, supra note 63, at 20 (brokers possess substantial knowledge of
property law).

188. See Radioactive Gas Alters Lives of Pennsylvanians, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1985, at AI0, col. 2. Anxious mortgage lenders as well as real estate agents, lawyers
and businessmen, have phoned hotlines in New Jersey to inquire about radon. See

Fearing Radon Threat, Hundreds Phone Agencies in 2 States, N.Y. Times, Sept.
29, 1985, at 55, col. 1.
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concerned about radon 8 9 and have been recommending that brokers

test and disclose results before the sale to prospective purchasers.' 9°
Thus, myriad sources alert the broker to radon's possible presence
in the area where he sells homes. 191 Breach of the duty to know
about the area therefore constitutes negligence. 92
Moreover, as the court in Easton noted, certain "red flags"' 193
may herald latent defects like radon to a broker. 94 For example,
weatherized homes may harbor particularly high concentrations because they have low air exchange rates. 19 Certain kinds of openings,
such as sewer pipe and sump pump openings, cracks in concrete,
wall-floor joints, and hollow block walls, also sharply increase a

189. See Effort to Estimate Levels of Radon Raising Concern in New England,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1986, at 68, col. I (Director of Southern Maine Regional
Planning Commission stating, "In Maine, the realtors are becoming aware that
buyers more and more want to know whether houses or buildings are radonfree .... As the buyers become more aware of this, the real estate interests react

to it").
190. See, e.g., Radon: For the Homeowner, Some Questions and Answers, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 1, 1987, at 39, col. 3.
The National Association of Realtors says that a sales agent must inform
a buyer if the agent believes a home is in a radon prone area. Failure
of a sales agent to tell a buyer facts affecting a home's value, including
past radon detection, could violate the association's code of ethics and
expose the agent to civil suit.
Id.

191. See supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 107-58, 1.70-77 and accompanying text. One critic said the
Easton court went too far because the true cause of action could have been for
negligent misrepresentation since the broker had reason to suspect, but failed to
investigate. See Judicial Imposition of a Duty to Inspect, supra note 114, at 850.
193. The court pointed out the "red flags" to illustrate that the defects would
be apparent to any alert observer. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 391. In addition to proving that the flags were apparent, the court also
shows that the brokers knew the significance of the flags but neglected to investigate
further. See id. supra note 114 and accompanying text.
194. The Easton court did not base liability on the broker's actual knowledge
of the red flags. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 104-05, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92.

The court found that they merely constituted notice-actual or constructive-to
the brokers of potential problems, which they should have investigated. See id.
The brokers breached their duty in not doing more than a "casual visual inspection
and a general inquiry of the owners." Id. at 105, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392. One
commentator has suggested that the duty to inspect be limited to situations in
which red flags are present so that the agent would have warning of the problem.
See Judicial Imposition of a Duty to Inspect, supra note 114, at 837 n.176.
195. As a result, the rate at which radon-laden air is replaced with outdoor air
decreases. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See generally AIR POLLUTION,
supra note 1.
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home's vulnerability to the gas. 19 6 From such broad exposure to
information about radon

97

as well as from on-site warnings 98 a

reasonable broker should know' 99 that a radon-laden home poses
foreseeable risks: 20 physical harm, 20 1 economic loss, 202 and emotional
distress .203
B. Policy Reasons for Holding Brokers Liable to Disclose
Radon to Buyers
The threat of potential liability will give brokers the incentive to
test for radon and thus prevent homebuyers from moving into a

contaminated home and suffering various forms of injury. 2

4

For

example, if occupants who discover high radon levels in their homes
continue to live there while remedying the problem, 205 the remedy
period added to the pre-discovery exposure period 20 6 may further
increase the occupants' risk of developing cancer. 20 7 Occupants knowing they have been exposed to high radiation levels may suffer an
ongoing fear of developing cancer. 20 8 Finally, depending on the
severity of the problem, the occupants may endure further hardship

in the form of the time 209 and expense 210 required to remedy the
problem. In contrast, a test initiated by the broker before the owners

196. See AIR POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 11.
197. See supra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
200. Risk "involves a recognizable danger, based upon some knowledge of the
existing facts, and some reasonable belief that harm may possibly follow." PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 71, § 31, at 170.
201. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 18, 208 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
205. If levels exceed safety levels, the EPA recommends leaving the home. See
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
206. The purchaser and his family may have been living in the home for a long
period of time before discovering the radon.
207. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (holding
that "[wlith or without physical injury or impact, a plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages for serious mental distress arising from fear of developing cancer where
his fear is reasonable and causally related to defendant's negligence"), modified,
797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986).
209. The amount of time required varies with the remedy available and the
specific cause of radon entry into the home. See supra notes 8-10.
210. See supra note 12.

1987]

RADON TESTING

move into the home2"' can virtually eliminate all risks by providing
notice to the homebuyer. Moreover, compared with the enormous
23
2 2
benefits to the buyer, the cost to the broker in time " and money

is minimal.
Thus, supplied with an accurate picture of the condition of the
home, the buyer can make an informed decision 214 that takes into
account all the health risks as well as factors affecting the value or
desirability of the property." 5 If the test reveals dangerously high
radon levels, the buyer may choose to wait until the health threat is
eliminated before occupying the home. 21 6 Disclosure of moderate
levels gives the buyer the opportunity to evaluate the risk of living
in the home during the repair period. 1 7 In either situation, advance
warning will prevent harmful radiation exposure.
In addition, inquiry duty and subsequent disclosure generally increase the efficiency of the real estate transaction. 21s If he chooses

to eliminate the radon before selling, the broker's client can add
such expenses into the sale price. 21 9 If he chooses, the buyer can
negotiate through the seller's broker a lower selling price in exchange

211. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text; see also Real Estate Transactions
and Radon, supra note 165, at 3, col. 1 (recommending that initial screening test
be performed in interval between contract and closing).
212. The only time lost on the completion of the sale is the time required for
a preliminary screening-at most four weeks. See supra note 8.
213. See supra note 9.
214. According to authority, the standards for professional behavior of a medical
doctor constitute a model of behavior applicable to all professions. See PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 71, § 32, at 185-86. Under the doctrine of informed
consent, a medical doctor or surgeon must disclose to the patient the risks involved
in treatment. See id. at 189-90. The premise underlying the doctrine is that every
person has the right to determine what shall be done to his own body. See id. In
addition, the doctor has greater professional and scientific knowledge than does
his patient. See id. Thus, the doctor must disclose sufficient information so that
the patient can take into account the risks when he reaches a decision regarding
the treatment. See id.
Similarly, the real estate broker has a duty to have professional and technical
knowledge regarding homes and real estate transactions. See id. at 185-86. He must
not withhold knowledge that may result in the buyer's physical injury and economic
loss. See id. In the case of radon, the buyer's informed decision includes careful
consideration of potential physical and economic harm. See id.
215. See generally Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr.
383 (1984).
216. See supra note 11.
217. See id.
218. See generally Implied Warranty of Lawful Use, supra note 63, at 20-21;
Imposing Tort Liability, supra note 67, at 1866-75.
219. See generally Imposing Tort Liability, supra note 67, at 1866-75.
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for bearing the cost to remedy. 220 Alternatively, the buyer may prefer

to condition the closing on the seller fixing the home. Finally, testing
prior to the sale completion prevents the expense of litigation at a
later date to all parties in the transaction.

. Testing by brokers also saves time. By testing once, the broker

eliminates the waste of each buyer arranging his own test.22 ' More-

over, by testing as soon as he receives the listing, the broker prevents
delays that may be costly and inconvenient at later stages of the
transaction. 222 For example, the seller may need the cash for a new
home, or the buyer may already have committed himself to vacate
his former home by a certain date.
Compared with the seller and the buyer, the broker is in the best
position to be aware of and to discover radon.2 3 Linked to an
extensive information network of professionals, 22 4 brokers have strong
incentive to learn of defects that affect the safety, desirability, and
value of real estate. 25 The broker also has greater access to resources
in the real estate field than the seller has and can more easily locate
a qualified tester. 226 In contrast, the seller has little incentive to
discover a latent defect that may lower the value of his home or
227
jeopardize its sale.
Despite extensive coverage by the press, 228 the general public continues to be unaware of radon. 22 9 In fact, many homeowners learned
20
about radon for the first time when it was discovered in their homes.
220. See id.
221. See generally Implied Warranty of Lawful Use, supra note 63, at 19 (proposing that single investigation is more efficient than requiring all potential buyers
to repeat inquiry).
222. See id.
223. See supra notes 178-203 and accompanying text. See generally Imposing
Tort Liability, supra note 67, at 1866-74 (broker is most efficient information
provider).
224. See supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
225. During an inspection, an experienced broker can discover much information
about the condition of a home and he will be especially attuned to factors that
affect real estate values. See Imposing Tort Liability, supra note 67, at 1868.
226. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
227. See Imposing Tort Liability, supra note 67, at 1869. An advantage of broker
testing is the prevention of fraud by the seller eager to dispose of property. See
Real Estate Transactions and Radon, supra note 165, at 2, col. 6 (not in seller's
interest to conduct radon test); Gas Test Assailed for Pennsylvania, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 2, 1986, at 53, col. I (in real estate transactions buyer should be able to
trust person who is selling house).
228. See supra notes 180-83.
229. See infra notes 230-33.
230, See, e.g., New System of Vents Eases A Radon Crisis, N.Y. Times, Dec.
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Even when they know about radon, its health threats often seem
remote, mainly because of the fact that the gas is imperceptible",
and the health effects are not immediate. 2 2 Furthermore, people
have strong psychological resistance to admitting that such an insidious problem exists in their home. 233 Thus, brokers could prevent
a variety of harms by warning prospective homebuyers of radon on
the premises.
IV.

Recommendations

To protect unwary homebuyers 23 4 Congress should enact legislation
that requires real estate brokers to test homes for radon when they
have reason to suspect its presence in houses for sale. 235 To promote
a comprehensive and consistent approach to the problem of radon
in homes, a test should be required whenever property changes
hands.2 6 Test results will enable homebuyers to make an informed
purchase and thus avoid potentially grave physical harm and economic loss.

237

24, 1986, at B2; cols. 3-4 (homeowner alerted by chemist neighbor of radon's
presence in immediate area said, " I never even heard of radon and didn't understand
what they were talking about").
231. Unlike many outdoor air pollutants, radon is colorless, odorless and detectible
only with scientific instruments. See generally Indoor Air Pollution, supra note 22,
at 362 n.183.
232. See id. Radon is not immediately harmful, since the resulting cancer has
a latency period of 20-30 years. See supra note 4.
233. See Indoor Air Pollution, supra note 22, at 362 n.183. Although radon
presents a problem of national significance, it tends to affect either isolated locales
or families. See id. In contrast, the public often becomes aware of outdoor air
pollution through publicized disasters, affecting large numbers of people simultaneously. See id.
Moreover, radon is a complex scientific dilemma requiring expert help at every
stage from testing to remedying. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. In
fact, the public's reaction to radon is one of bewilderment. For example, one
resident said, "We've been here all these years, and I don't see why we should
get too upset." Scenic Site Unsettled By Radon, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1986, at
BI, col. 1. Another resident whose house had the highest concentration of radon
ever reported in his community said, "I'm dealing with something that's invisible,
it's silent and it's a killer. I don't understand it and I'm terrified." Radioactive
Gas Alters Lives of Pennsylvanians, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1985, at A10, col. 2.
Finally, people have strong emotional and financial ties to their homes which,
combined with radon's intangible nature, may blind them to its latent dangers.
See Indoor Air Pollution, supra note 22, at 362 n.183.
234. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 178-96 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 4-6, 13-15 and accompanying text.
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The EPA could easily implement and enforce such a specifically
targeted statute through the states. 23 s The EPA and the states already
have a working relationship through the EPA radon education program. 2 9 Moreover, the EPA could establish jurisdiction through
several existing statutes-most notably the Clean Air Act 240 and the
241
Uranium Mill Tailings Act.
243
42
The EPA has already researched radon and its health hazards.

244
Despite the fact that the EPA has been actively researching radon,
the agency has no current plans to regulate radon because it is a
naturally-occurring form of indoor air pollution. 245 Experts, however,

have called the EPA's indoor-outdoor distinction invalid from a
health point of view. 246 The ultimate effect of the gas-increased
risk of lung cancer 24 7-is the same, regardless of its origin. 24s In
fact, natural radon poses a greater health hazard than do most manmade pollutants. 249 For example, "[p]eople who live near the Three
Mile Island plant receive more radiation exposure from radon in
their homes every day than they got in total from the 1979 accident
there. '250 In addition, radon concentrations are higher indoors than

238. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text for examples of state statutes
protecting homebuyers.
239. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 22-23.
241. See supra note 17 and accompaning text.
242. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 17, 23 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 17, 24 and accompanying text.

246. See U.S. Spending on Radiation Dangers Is Skewed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6,
1985, at A34, col. 3 [hereinafter Spending on Radiation] (letter from Bernard L.
Cohen, Professor of Physics, University of Pittsburgh).
247. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
248. Professor Cohen stated that "[w]hen radiation strikes a molecule in the
nucleus of a human cell, which is a cancer-initiating event, there is no possible
way for that molecule to 'know' whether that radiation came from radon or from
plutonium produced in a reactor; the consequences must therefore be the same."

Spending on Radiation, supra note 246, at A34, col. 3; see also U.S. to Conduct
National Survey To Determine Radon Gas Hazard, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1985,
at 23, col. 5 (Richard E. Yuhnke, official with the Environmental Defense Fund,
stating that setting of the gas does not change its effects).
249. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
250. Spending On Radiation, supra note 246, at A34, col. 3. Americans currently
receive fifty times more exposure to radiation from radon in their homes than they
will eventually receive from the nuclear power industry, based on nuclear accident
,projections by the Union of Concerned Scientists. See id. Even people who live
next door to nuclear power plants get more radiation exposure in a day from radon
than they get in a year from the plants. See id.
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outdoors.' As a result, occupants who are most susceptible to the
dangers of radon-the young, the old, and the ill-those who are
likely to spend more time indoors,2 52 are at greater risk.
In 1986, the Government Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative and auditing arm of Congress, published a comprehensive
report 253 covering: (1) the public's exposure to and health effects of
radon; 254 (2) the costs and methods of reducing radon;2 55 and (3)
federal efforts to address the problem. 256 The report recommended
that Congress designate the EPA as responsible for both researching
and regulating radon, 257 which the report called a "growing national
concern. ' 258 The stated purpose of the GAO in proposing such EPA
responsibility is "a unified, consistent, and well-coordinated approach
to addressing indoor radon problems, ' 25 9 and "clear accountability." ' 260 In fact, a recent internal EPA report concluded that the
agency has been focusing on lesser environmental problems to the
detriment of such "high risk ' 26' problems as radon.2 62
Since the EPA now regulates outdoor air pollution, other federal
agencies naturally look to the EPA for guidance on indoor pollution
problems like radon. 263 Furthermore, the EPA is now doing most of
the current radon research and is implementing a strategy to address
the problem throughout the states, 264 which rely on the EPA for
education and guidance in dealing with the problem. 265 For example,
266
the agency has published a list of qualified testers.
Thus, by providing the benefits of its superior knowledge, the
EPA can eliminate the need for sellers, buyers and brokers to research
the difficult scientific intricacies of radon and its health hazards. 267

251. See Indoor Air Pollution, supra note 22, at 340; see also supra note 10.

252. See id.
253. See generally AIR POLLUTION, supra note 1.
254. See id. at 18-24.

255. See id. at 26-34.
256. See id. at 36-43.
257. See id. at 49.
258. See id. at 1.
259. See id. at 49.
260. See id.
261. See EPA Report Says Agency Focuses on Lesser Problems, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 19, 1987, at B6, col. 5.
262. See id.

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See generally AnR POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 41-43.
See id. at 40-41.
See id.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, EPA regulation of testing by brokers would significantly reduce negligent and fraudulent testing.2 6 The EPA would
simply prescribe official testing methods, 269 establish mandatory safe
levels,2 70 and require the broker to test, a duty which the states
would enforce. 271 Such a duty would merely be one aspect of the
broker's larger professional and ethical responsibility to conduct an
investigation of property for sale for the protection of the physical
272
and economic well being of the prospective homebuyer.
In a real estate transaction, there are many variables. Usually the
broker is in the best position to monitor them.27 1 Moreover, he has
the advantage of knowledge and experience 274 and, therefore, can
easily set up a radon testing system in his practice, using outside
experts.2 75 Testing costs are low, 76 and some states currently offer
free radon testing.2 77 Furthermore, potential liability would give the
278
broker strong incentive to test.
V. Conclusion
Currently, most radon in homes originates from nature, a source
that Congress did not anticipate when it enacted the Uranium Mill
268. See, e.g., Gas Test Assailedfor Pennsylvanians, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1986,

at 53, col. 1. Despite state recommendations that real estate companies in Pennsylvania use radon tests certified by the EPA, some companies were using outmoded
tests. According to one expert, " '[t]he problem with real estate transactions is
you have to trust the person who owns the house. If a window is left open, you
can get a very different reading. If you have an electrostatic precipitator .

.

. that

can get the level down significantly.' " Id.
In Butte, Montana, residents opened windows hours before radon testing that
was required by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and as a
result, gas levels fell. See id.; see also AIR POLLUTION, supra note 1, at 38-39.
269. See supra note 7.

270. Currently, the EPA merely recommends safe levels. See supra note 11.
271. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 204-83 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
275. According to one authority, "[a]s scientific knowledge advances, and more
and more effective tests become available, what was excusable ignorance yesterday
becomes negligent ignorance today." PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 71,
§ 32, at 185. Furthermore, the Code of Ethics of the National Association of
Realtors prohibits a realtor from providing "specialized professional services concerning a type of property or service that is outside his field of competence unless
he engages the assistance of one who is competent on such types of property or
service, or unless the facts are fully disclosed to the client." Menzel v. Morse, 362
N.W.2d 465, 469 (Iowa 1985) (quoting National Ass'n of Realtors Code of Ethics,
art. 11 (7th ed. 1978)).
276. See supra note 9.
277. See id.
278. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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Tailings Control Act to address the dangers of man-made radon.
Regardless of its origin, all radon causes lung cancer. Thus, Congress
must regulate naturally-occurring radon in homes to prevent many
potential deaths. As a knowledgeable professional obligated to inspect
property for sale, the real estate broker can arrange for a test as
soon as a home goes on the market, thereby preventing both loss
of time in the sales transaction and potentially harmful exposure of
homebuyers to deadly radon gas.
Sheldon Winicour

